

EVALUATING AND TESTING RESOLUTIONS FOR NUCLEAR THREATS  
ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PERPETRATED BY  
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA:  
INCENTIVES FOR DENUCLEARIZATION TESTED ON  
THE LIBYA AND IRAN MODELS

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A research study submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the  
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies

Baltimore, Maryland  
January 2021

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**Abstract:**

Current United Nations Sanctions Resolutions (UNSCR) on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have slightly hindered the nation's ability to procure, proliferate, and test essential resources and elements of its nuclear weapons program. Although nine UNSCRs have been adopted since 2006, the DPRK's nuclear program has further developed, despite pressure from the United Nations and international community calling on the nation to denuclearize. As of December 2020, the DPRK has continued its proliferation of materials and resources to build and sustain its nuclear program and has not agreed to denuclearization agreements and negotiations. The overarching objective of UNSCRs is to eventually influence the DPRK to denuclearize, although UNSCRs have only accomplished its secondary goal of delaying nuclear progression by making it more difficult for the DPRK to acquire the necessary materials to build and sustain its nuclear program. In short, the three proposals this study offers are: incentivize the DPRK to rejoin the negotiating table to achieve partial or full denuclearization, establish a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and incentivize UN Member States and DPRK trade partners to halt trade with the DPRK. The predicted methods rely on reestablishing diplomatic talks or relationships, such as resuming summit discussions with the United States or United Nations (or another nation/world body) and incentivizing the DPRK to return to negotiations. Incentives include offering the DPRK economic reward; for example, proposing membership into world market organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, in exchange for denuclearization. Incentivizing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons for economic prosperity could increase the likelihood that the DPRK will denuclearize, as

the nation's economy is one of the world's lowest. As such, the purpose of this study is to examine the nine UNSCRs currently in place and test the three proposals on the Libya and Iran denuclearization models as testing the proposals on the DPRK is not possible. Results of the study conclude that the three proposals tested against experiences and lessons drawn from Libya and Iran are feasible and practical options for moving forward in achieving denuclearization of the DPRK.

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## **Introduction:**

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), colloquially known as North Korea, has been systematically evading United Nations (UN) Security Council Sanctions Resolutions since its first nuclear weapons test in 2006. As a direct response to the DPRK's illicit nuclear program, the UN Security Council imposed the first of nine UN Sanctions Resolutions (UNSCR) on the nation. Discouraging the DPRK's testing and use of nuclear weapons is a challenging effort, however, as nuclear weapons have the potential to cause tremendous, irreversible damage to the safety and security of humanity and the planet, this effort is necessary. The threat of nuclear war is a major cause for concern as the DPRK has consistently refused to full denuclearization under previously agreed upon terms, despite countless economic and material sanctions severely limiting the DPRK's trade and revenue generation. Aimed at restricting the DPRK's ability to procure and test nuclear weapons, sanctions resolutions have only mildly disturbed the overall program and has made it more difficult, but not impossible, for the DPRK to acquire the supplies and funds needed to sustain and build its nuclear program. Further, the DPRK's apparent and methodical disregard for sanctions and restrictions is causing a direct and dangerous threat on the international security posture.

In recent years, the DPRK has publicly denounced and refused to participate in various international treaties, including the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), agreements made by nations with the objective to end the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The DPRK had previously signed the NPT in 1985, though the nation withdrew in 2003.<sup>1</sup> The DPRK

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<sup>1</sup> P'yongyang KCNA, North Korea Explains Withdrawal from the NPT, January 22, 2003, <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk012203.html>.

claimed that development of its nuclear power industry was, “the best method for resolving the electricity issue in our country’s conditions” and it “legally restricted the usage of atomic power to only peaceful purposes.”<sup>2</sup> Further, the DPRK’s international “rapsheet” includes, conducting and supporting international terrorism, illegal drug, human, wildlife, and arms trafficking, counterfeiting goods and money, and the largest threat on the international community, nuclear weapons proliferation, procurement, and testing.<sup>3</sup> At its core, the DPRK is a criminal state and the entirety of its government thrives on revenue produced through its criminal activity. After causing and sustaining its own rejection from the international community, the DPRK relies on criminal activity to generate revenue to support the regime’s continued desire for a “world-class” nuclear weapons program.

The purpose of this study is to draw comparisons from denuclearization efforts conducted with either Libya or Iran (or both). As implementing and testing real, new sanctions language on the DPRK and employing actual incentives to test these theories is not possible for the purpose of this study, discussing feasible approaches and incentives drawn from comparative analysis between the Libya and Iran model and DPRK may be a productive way forward. Through comparative analysis and theoretical tests, this study aims to answer the research question of: what incentives and proposals should the international community offer and utilize against the DPRK in exchange for limiting or eliminating its nuclear weapons program? Further, what can the international community

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Rexton Kan and Bruce Bechtol, “Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International Activities,” JSTOR, 2010, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11861>, vii.

learn from previous denuclearization experiences that may be effective in achieving denuclearization of the DPRK?

## **Background:**

### ***DPRK Nuclear Program***

When President Donald J. Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, the U.S. policy towards the DPRK was reformed as the nation's growing nuclear and ballistic missile program had rapidly established itself as the international community's most serious security challenge.<sup>4</sup> The Trump Administration sought a serious and lasting arrangement that would, "rollback Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program," which at the time, was thought to include an estimated fifty kilograms of separated plutonium, "enough material for more than 10 warheads."<sup>5</sup> DPRK leader Kim Jong Un's intention to expand his nation's nuclear arsenal was met with direct attempts by the U.S. and other nations to significantly weaken the DPRK's ability to proliferate nuclear goods, as well as its ability to generate revenue to continue funding its nuclear program. The new approach the Trump Administration advertised and urged other nations to follow was a policy plan to work with regional partners and increase pressure on the DPRK. By increasing pressure on the DPRK, later evolving into the U.S.' "maximum pressure" campaign, the nation would be further isolated and eventually be forced to fully denuclearize. The need for nations, such as China, to enforce UN sanctions and possible sanctions on China to "enhance its compliance,"<sup>6</sup> were also proposed, but did not lead to

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<sup>4</sup> "Recalibrating U.S. Policy Toward North Korea," Arms Control Association, February 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/Issue-Briefs/2017-02-01/Recalibrating-US-Policy-Toward-North-Korea>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

substantial actions or impact. Additionally, maintaining this policy ultimately did not halt, or even weaken, the DPRK's nuclear advances and the nation has continued its nuclear procurement and illicit revenue generating activities.

In September 2017, the DPRK conducted a hydrogen bomb test that subsequently raised “international alarm due to the yield of its explosion”<sup>7</sup> and the U.S. redesignated the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism. Between January and November 2017, the DPRK's relationship with the U.S. and its allies was extremely hostile, as both the U.S. and its allies, and the DPRK, threatened military action against each other.<sup>8</sup> The DPRK flaunted a nuclear tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could allegedly reach U.S. soil,<sup>9</sup> which was interpreted by the U.S. as a threat, and the U.S. warned of a potential, retaliatory military strike. In March 2018, historic news regarding the “First U.S. – North Korea Summit”<sup>10</sup> was scheduled to occur in Singapore and after years of hostile relations between the DPRK and international community, it was assessed that the DPRK was agreeing to participate in a summit due to fears of a military attack, ongoing sanctions pressure, and the realization that negotiations may ease strict policies. The planned meeting of Kim Jong Un and President Trump would become the first meeting between a sitting U.S. President and DPRK leader, however, the summit was delayed in late-May 2018 after the DPRK's continued threats and inability to commit to negotiations angered the U.S. and the international community. Finally, in June 2018, the momentous meeting in Singapore was held where the theme of the summit was to improve the U.S.-

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<sup>7</sup> “North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: A Brief History” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations>.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.



DPRK relationship in which both parties signed a joint statement, “pledging to pursue lasting peace and complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”<sup>11</sup> Importantly, President Trump agreed to suspend U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) military exercises, which are planned exercises where both the U.S. and the ROK hold military drills in case of potential conflict with the DPRK, and Kim Jong Un agreed to destroy a missile engine test site.<sup>12</sup> A few months later in September 2018, Kim Jong Un and ROK President Moon Jae-in met to sign a joint-Koreas declaration that detailed the two nations’ objectives to reduce tension and increase cooperation.<sup>13</sup> From the DPRK’s viewpoint, the U.S. did not adhere to President Trump’s pledge and diplomatic relations did not improve.

Moving forward, in February 2019, President Trump and Kim Jong Un held a second summit in Vietnam, but significant disagreements concerning sanctions relief and denuclearization<sup>14</sup> caused tensions, as both parties could not reach a set agreement:

Trump says Kim agreed to dismantle the nuclear and fissile material production facilities...in exchange for complete sanctions relief, but the U.S. president wanted more substantial steps on denuclearization and verification. North Korean officials dispute Trump’s account, saying Kim demanded only partial sanctions relief. Both leaders leave Vietnam early, without signing a planned joint statement, but indicate talks will continue. Trump says they parted on “friendly” terms, while North Korea’s foreign ministry warns it will not change its position.<sup>15</sup>

Most recently, in June 2019, President Trump and Kim Jong Un recommenced the nuclear talks that ended in disagreement in Vietnam, however, “working-level nuclear

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

talks in Sweden in October broke off”<sup>16</sup> and resolutions were not met. Ultimately, the summits and talks did not produce productive results as the DPRK’s primary concern of lessening strict sanctions, and the U.S.’ goal of reaching denuclearization agreements were not met. While the DPRK has been able to creatively evade UNSCRs, it was seeking the easing of sanctions to alleviate this ongoing challenge as sanctions significantly impact its ability to generate revenue and sustain its nuclear program. However, without official commitment and/or evidence of denuclearization, the UN and broader international community will not lift sanctions against the DPRK and without easing of sanctions, the DPRK has indicated that it will not denuclearize.

### ***Current UN Sanctions Resolutions on the DPRK***

The acquisition and proliferation of nuclear weapons, along with materials to construct and eventually test nuclear weapons, is currently one of the world’s greatest threats on international security. Nuclear weapons are considered a weapon of last resort and after the conclusion of World War II and the constant threat and fear of nuclear warfare during the Cold War, nuclear weapons have become rather taboo, meaning that the use of nuclear weapons in any manner or scenario is an unthinkable and “forbidden” action. While there are many laws, sanctions, restrictions, and agreements in place that discourage the use and testing of nuclear weapons, the DPRK is an international “cockroach,” surviving all attempts by the international community to fully denuclearize the state. After initial attempts, such as the NPT, to restrict the DPRK’s nuclear program,

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<sup>16</sup> “Timeline: From Historic Summit to Building Destruction, North Korea Unsettles U.S.,” Reuters, June 16, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-usa-timeline/timeline-from-historic-summit-to-building-destruction-north-korea-unsettles-u-s-idUSKBN23N37H>.

the UN was forced to enact and conduct an official condemnation against the DPRK. The UN's dedicated efforts to restrict the DPRK in the twenty-first century began in October 2006 when, "North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, despite warnings by the country's principal economic benefactors, China and South Korea, not to proceed."<sup>17</sup>

Between 2006 and 2017, the UN Security Council has imposed nine UNSCRs on the DPRK: Resolution 1718 (2006), Resolution 1874 (2009), Resolution 2087 (2013), Resolution 2094 (2013), Resolution 2270 (2016), Resolution 2321 (2016), Resolution 2371 (2017), Resolution 2375 (2017), Resolution 2397 (2017). The UN Security Council determined that the most appropriate way forward was to impose significant and impactful UNSCRs against the DPRK that all UN member-states must enforce. The UN recognized that the DPRK "problem" needed to be met with compromise on all sides, especially as the U.S. was promoting a tough, unwavering stance and China and Russia were opting for a more lenient approach against the DPRK. Each UNSCR is a direct and calculated attempt at motivating the DPRK to cease its illicit activities, all of such illicit activities are in violation of the previous UNSCR. Although the nine UNSCRs are in place to restrict and deter the DPRK's criminal activity, the DPRK has, on a global scale, continued to commit these crimes and are committing even more offenses by directly violating these UNSCRs.

To understand what proposals may work when deterring the DPRK from its continued nuclear efforts, the details of nine major UNSCRs on the DPRK that have been enacted in response to its nuclear and missile activities offers unique insight and provides foundation for assessing the successes and failures of each UNSCR placed on the DPRK

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<sup>17</sup> Marcus Noland, "The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea," *Asia Policy* 7, no. 1 (2009): pp. 61-88, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2009.0047>, 63.

(see Appendix). When evaluating all nine UNSCRs and determining if any successfully led to the denuclearization of the DPRK, the analysis indicates that the overall outcome of each resulted in failure. However, the UNSCRs are partially succeeding by causing and sustaining major limitations in how the DPRK's nuclear program is able to operate. The strain and stress UNSCRs place on the DPRK's revenue and nuclear material generating programs has promoted varying levels of negotiations (both successful and unsuccessful) with the DPRK as the strict sanctions and policies are difficult, but not impossible, to navigate around. The UNSCRs anticipated outcome of denuclearizing the DPRK failed, while the alternative goal of forcing the DPRK back to the negotiation table became more realistic.

***Overview of Existing Thought on DPRK Denuclearization:***

Sanctions experts have argued that a UNSCR itself is not going to change a state's objective, especially if the state is building and sustaining a nuclear program. The desire to nuclearize indicates that the nation is already in noncompliance with numerous international sanctions and norms and an UNSCR is not going to change this behavior. In the DPRK's case, its dismissal and continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is a result of the state believing that it has a right to nuclearize and is entitled to disregard UNSCRs. However, to make an overarching statement such as, "UNSCRs never work" is incorrect as, "the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the alternative policy instruments available to policy practitioners."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Thomas Biersteker and Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, "How and When Do Sanctions Work? The Evidence," European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015, 17.

Another factor to consider is the lack of diplomatic relationship with the DPRK and how this has also led to the failure of UNSCRs:

...if basic conditions for success are not met or if the agreed measures are not implemented, then a sanction should actually be expected to fail... if no or very little economic or diplomatic exchange was taking place before sanctions were enacted, then the impact of sanctions will inevitably be weaker.<sup>19</sup>

This theory assists in explaining the failures of sanctions against the DPRK as the UN and its member states have been unsuccessful in its attempts to form an effective diplomatic relationship with the DPRK. While the DPRK does have some form of cursory diplomatic relationship with over one hundred nations, these nations have not provided much assistance in working with the DPRK and have not produced any significant impact on the DPRK's relationship with the UN. In order to achieve desired diplomatic relations with the DPRK, the question of, "what does the DPRK want?" must be explored. It is apparent that the DPRK "wants" to sustain its nuclear program, but is the nation willing to negotiate and disarm certain aspects of this program if it means sanctions would ease? Sanctions experts argue that the DPRK is largely unwilling to agree to full denuclearization simply because the negotiations have not resulted in any DPRK-desired outcomes. Negotiations have not resulted in any attractive incentives for the DPRK to denuclearize, although this is where diplomatic talks and continued negotiation would greatly benefit. Additionally, experts assess that the DPRK's continued pursuit of its nuclear program is not necessarily its desire to be armed, but DPRK officials view the U.S.' pressure originates from its belief that:

...the only purpose of US policy is to liquidate the DPRK as a state or even "physically destroy" the country and its leadership. The regime does not believe that removal of North Korean nuclear weapons per se is very significant to the

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

US, and rather sees this demand as an attempt to undermine the country's deterrence and gain advantage for a military solution of the Korean issue or regime change by other means.<sup>20</sup>

Diplomatic talks and active negotiations would ease these judgements and allow active dialogue between the DPRK and UN (and other entities) to reach a feasible, compromise to achieve all objectives.

## **Proposals**

To achieve denuclearization of the DPRK, this report offers three proposals that will be tested and evaluated against similar case-studies of Libya or Iran's denuclearization efforts. The proposals were created after review of UNSCRs and analyzing existing thought on this topic and comparable case studies were discovered to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the offered ideas. The three proposals include, (1) incentivizing the DPRK to return to negotiations regarding denuclearization, (2) establishing a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and (3) incentivizing UN member states and DPRK trade partners to enforce sanctions.

### ***(1) Incentivize the DPRK to Negotiate***

This first proposal requires elements of both establishing diplomatic talks with the DPRK, as well as incentivizing the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. In order to entice the DPRK, diplomatic talks are needed to promote potential incentives for the country's denuclearization and member states and trade partners will need to enforce

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<sup>20</sup> Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, William Brown, and Leo Byrne, "Can Diplomacy Work with North Korea?: Informed Analysis of North-Korea," 38 North, December 13, 2017, <https://www.38north.org/2017/12/gtoloraya121317/>.

sanctions to further highlight the gain the DPRK will incur. Currently, the DPRK is one of the world's lowest ranking economies and relies almost entirely on China for revenue generated from both import and export with the country. Providing the DPRK incentives that promote economic gain, such as admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank will attract the DPRK. In 2010, it was projected that the DPRK's trade volume would increase by, "5.6 to 8.3 times...if North Korea were to become a normal economy."<sup>21</sup> Additionally and from these same projections, "if North Korea were to move toward reform and denuclearization, inter-Korean trade would grow rapidly from the present amount of roughly \$2 billion per year to approximately \$11 to \$16 billion per year by 2020."<sup>22</sup> By refusing to denuclearize, over time, the DPRK is costing itself several billion dollars in revenue and it is predicted that it would have even more money as the nuclear program will no longer require significant monetary funding.<sup>23</sup> By offering admission into world trade market organizations and presenting these economic projections to the DPRK, the DPRK will feel pressure to rejoin negotiations and secure a more stable economic future.

## ***(2) Establish a Diplomatic Relationship with the DPRK***

For sanctions to be effective in accomplishing the end objective of dismantling the DPRK's nuclear program, a concrete, diplomatic relationship and frequent diplomatic talks with the DPRK are necessary to achieve successful strategies for denuclearization.

In this study, the term "diplomatic relations" is defined as an official diplomatic

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<sup>21</sup> Scott Snyder, "The Economic Costs of North Korean Nuclear Development," Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/economic-costs-north-korean-nuclear-development>.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

relationship, or “multilateral diplomacy,” as an alternative to current, official diplomatic relations. Multilateral diplomacy is, “the management of international relations by negotiations among three or more states through diplomatic or governmental representatives, but it can also be engaged in by representatives of non-state actors.”<sup>24</sup> This lack of an official, diplomatic relationship is limiting the success of UN sanctions and prolonging international security concerns surrounding the DPRK’s nuclear program. The issues are prolonged when the DPRK suddenly conducts a nuclear test and new sanctions are implemented without any discussion from either side. By re-offering the DPRK an official avenue for negotiation, significant improvement can be made by creating a diplomatic channel that allows transparency and promotes active cooperation with nations such as the U.S., who hold tremendous influence over the international community’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear program.

### ***(3) Incentivize UN Member States and DPRK Trade Partners***

For an UNSCR to function as intended, the sanctioned nation should acknowledge and adhere to these restrictions, but more importantly, UN member states must enforce it. As there are issues with DPRK trade partners enforcing such sanctions, there must be incentives for these nations to enforce UNSCRs on the DPRK. The issue rests on the reliance the DPRK has formed with its key trade partners. As identified, the DPRK relies on crucial trade partners to evade sanctions and without the assistance from such trade partners, the sanctions would actually enforce an effective deterrent and lead to a negotiated denuclearization of the DPRK. Potential incentives include implementing a

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<sup>24</sup> James P. Muldoon Jr. and JoAnn Fagot Aviel, “Multilateral Diplomacy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.462>.



justice for action program, where the UN and its member states participate in a global effort to motivate the DPRK to denuclearize and dismantle its nuclear arms program and activities through full enforcement of sanctions. Other incentives, such as economic and political incentives, have also been successful. Lastly, should incentives prove largely ineffective, shifting to maximum pressure practices such as imposing sanctions on nations who violate these UNSCRs will promote quick and impactful results.<sup>25</sup> Adopting additional sanctions that specifically target noncomplying nations would ultimately force these nations to reconsider their trade with the DPRK. Successful models include denying nations access to the U.S. market and only lifting these restrictions when the nation halts its trade with the sanctioned nation. Should the DPRK's trade partners prompt its own sanctions, potentially limiting its access to world trade, it is predicted that the nations would choose the world market over trade with the DPRK.<sup>26</sup>

As of 2017, a large number of nations still engage in trade, both import and export, with the DPRK, despite increased international pressure to halt such exchanges. Export destinations include, Pakistan, India, Ghana, and China; import destinations include, Russia, India, Peru, Honduras, and China.<sup>27</sup> China accounts for an astounding ninety-four percent of imports and ninety-one percent of exports for the DPRK.<sup>28</sup> As such, incentivizing these nations to halt all trade with the DPRK to further isolate the nation, as well as strictly enforcing sanctions will decrease the DPRK's sanctions evasion practices as it would no longer have trade partners enabling trade that sustains its nuclear

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<sup>25</sup> Arshad Mohammed and Michelle Nichols, "U.S. Plans to Enforce U.N. Sanctions on Iran with Its Own Action," (September 16, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-britain-iran/u-s-plans-to-enforce-u-n-sanctions-on-iran-with-its-own-action-idUSKBN2672UE>.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Katharina Buchholz and Felix Richter, "Infographic: Who Is North-Korea Trading With?," Statista Infographics, September 6, 2019, <https://www.statista.com/chart/10683/north-korea-trading-partners/>.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

pursuits. Subsequently, the DPRK will be negatively impacted and its ability to survive without negotiating to reopen trade is unlikely. Further, providing economic incentives to trade nations by increasing its legitimate and approved trade will positively impact its ability to halt trade with the DPRK. By providing comparable, or if possible, a greater revenue stream, these nations would no longer require the DPRK as a trade partner.

### **Methods:**

This study assesses that drawing conclusions and best practices, also referred to as historical analogies, from either the Libya or Iran model, or both, will reveal if the proposed methods are feasible/infeasible, desirable/undesirable, and/or likely to be effective or ineffective. Although, the application of a historical analogy is extremely important and determining the feasibility of a particular analogy is often very challenging. Ernest R. May and Richard Neustadt in *Thinking In Time: The Uses Of History For Decision Makers*, explain that there is a fine line between the correct and incorrect use of history in decision making. May and Neustadt urge policymakers to consider how lessons from history must be used cautiously and meticulously as seeking analogies from history can both, “inform and misinform the assessment of current issues and events.”<sup>29</sup> May and Neustadt also argue that the importance of a historical analogy relies on history’s successes and failures as the foundation for accurately constructing predictions. In other words, leaders must study history not as a narrative of events, but as a way to discover appropriate parallels to apply to current and future issues. When using

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<sup>29</sup> Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, “Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. Richard E. Neustadt, Ernest R. May,” *The Journal of Politics* 49, no. 2 (1987): pp. 604-607, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2131318>.

historical analogies correctly, it can inform government officials and policymakers of potential, practical tactics that may be successful (or unsuccessful) with a current political issue.

The DPRK issue is unique as it involves advanced nuclear proliferation activities and testing; however, both the Libya and Iran's denuclearization models contain comparable elements to consider (for different proposals) as both nations had or have nuclear ambitions, but have been otherwise motivated, discouraged, and/or forced to comply with restrictions when it sought to engage in nuclear pursuit. By evaluating and demonstrating the feasibility of each proposal against either the Libya or Iran models (or both), assessing the success of these comparisons rely on how either nation (or both) reacted to similar tactics and will determine if the proposed solutions are a promising way forward against the DPRK. To clarify, this study does not aim to specifically test all three proposals on the denuclearization models of *both* Libya and Iran; rather, this study aims to evaluate the offered proposals against elements found in *either* the Libya or Iran denuclearization models to determine feasible/infeasible, desirable/undesirable, and/or likely to be effective or ineffective, with one proposal's data overlapping both models.

By including both Libya and Iran in this case-study comparison, the expected lessons learned/successes and failures from either/both models will provide valuable context and perspective for how to approach the denuclearization of the DPRK, or at least, offer milestones that must be met before abandoning all proposed strategies and enacting final and non-negotiable restrictions on the DPRK. Once the three proposals were determined, the research involved finding relevant case studies to assess the feasibility and likely effectiveness of each proposal, based on data found from previous

denuclearization experiences. Libya and Iran were selected with May and Neustadt's historical analogy guidance in mind as numerous nations have experienced denuclearization, either voluntarily or forced, though the Libya and Iran models offer specific, relevant comparisons to this study's three proposals (evaluated in Data section). Overall, this study aims to conclude if elements of denuclearization experiences with either Libya or Iran (or both) are appropriate historical analogies for the DPRK issue.

Relatedly, Markus Kornprobst in *Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies* writes that historical analogies are, "important tools to make sense of the world. This applies to the decision-makers we study as well as to us as students of world politics."<sup>30</sup> Although, some historical analogies can lead policymakers astray and the Libya and Iran models for the DPRK issue are not precisely similar (but also not entirely dissimilar), "to some extent historical analogies always compare apples and oranges."<sup>31</sup> While the methods used with Libya and Iran cannot be replicated exactly, this study assesses that the DPRK issue will require this comparison of "apples to oranges." Keeping in mind that a perfect historical analogy does not exist, this study proposes methods that were successful with Libya and/or Iran and offers comparable and applicable similarities. As such, this study is comparing apples and oranges and is only able to draw successes and failures from similar, analogous models, vice an identical and successful denuclearization case to use directly with the DPRK.

To determine which specific proposals and resulting testing methods are most practical for the purposes of this project, the primary consideration concerns the lack of

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<sup>30</sup> Markus Kornprobst, "Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies," SAGE Journals, 2007, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070360010301>, 29.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 30-31.

publicly available and accessible data on the DPRK's nuclear efforts. Information that is not available concerns the DPRK's own comprehensive analysis and response to current sanctions and other denuclearization efforts. Aside from public statements made – aimed at sharing an often-incorrect narrative of the DPRK's nuclear program – the data concerning the DPRK's internal response to sanctions and denuclearization efforts are not available on open-source research platforms. For this reason, testing and evaluating this project's proposals in comparison to the DPRK itself is not a practical test model and the Libya and Iran models are used as the comparison, in its place.

*Evaluative Criteria –*

While the simplest approach is to utilize existing UNSCRs and the international community's pressure to denuclearize the DPRK, the proposed, new variables must be introduced into the test. To reiterate, (1) providing economic incentives to the DPRK, (2) establishing an official and lasting diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and (3) offering incentives for cooperation by nations providing assistance to the DPRK are assessed to aid in the denuclearization of the DPRK. Each proposal, as it relates to the DPRK, coupled with relevant data found from either the Libya or Iran models (or both) are evaluated as: feasible/infeasible, desirable/undesirable, and likely to be effective/ineffective. As the study specifically sought to find data that supports and strengthens the arguments presented in each proposal, the only elements that were negative (infeasible, undesirable, and likely to be ineffective) were found when compared against a model that did not offer an accurate analogy. For example, each proposal was evaluated against both the Libya and Iran model, though the study found that only

Proposal 2 proved feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective, based on denuclearization experiences of *both* Libya and Iran. Proposal 1 and 3 were evaluated against *only* Iran and were feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective, as the Iran model offered a much more relevant and analogous comparison to accurately test this study's proposals.

**Proposal 1:** Based on initial research, it was predicted that the Iran model is feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective when compared against efforts to denuclearize the DPRK. As Libya's denuclearization was achieved primarily through successful diplomacy, the Libya model does not provide valuable analogies to evaluate and test against Proposal 1. Of course, there are various elements that must work together to achieve successful results, however, for this proposal, it is assessed that the Iran model offers a much more feasible and effective approach to incentivizing the DPRK to negotiate. The DPRK's inability to join world trade market organizations, as well as its inability to trade with the rest of the world economy, is severely limiting its economic potential. Of course, the DPRK is inflicting this economic hardship on itself as adhering to sanctions and denuclearizing will solve this issue, however, the nation likely requires outside incentives or influences to cast a "spotlight" on the benefits of this proposal. Assessing the results of economic incentives within the Iran model will offer concrete data and provide practical techniques to reengage the DPRK.

**Proposal 2:** The experiences drawn from the Libya and Iran models were predicted to reveal that establishing an official diplomatic relationship with the DPRK is a feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective proposal. Based on factors drawn from both models, this proposal has been highly effective with Libya and consistently effective with Iran. As such, there is a high likelihood that this same method, or substantial features of this proposal, will be successful with the DPRK. To test this proposal the Libya and Iran model were used as the comparative example. While it was assessed that the Libya model is one that would offer successful strategies to diplomatically engage with the DPRK and will be useful in predicting the success or failure of this proposal, the Iran model also relies heavily on multilateral diplomacy and can offer relevant analogies for achieving similar, successful results with the DPRK. Specifically, the Libya model is a comparable case-study and presents notable, relevant strategies to consider in determining the most achievable methods in deterring the DPRK from continuing to expand its nuclear program.

**Proposal 3:** Based on factors gathered from the Iran model, this proposal is hypothesized to be, feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective as the success of the Iran model advises that member states and DPRK trade partners will avoid trade with the DPRK, if assessed that sanctions are a legitimate consequence for continued trade. To test this proposal, Iran model will be used as the comparative example as the Libya model does not include specific incentives provided to UN member states and trade partners. Further, an element of this method also involves creating circumstances that strongly encourages nations to impose and adhere to set sanctions. Relying on nations to enforce sanctions on

the DPRK is a difficult task, but offering incentives to ease its decision-making will provide better, more impactful results. In particular, economic incentives that allow trade partners to fully abandon the DPRK for economic prosperity will be possible, if the incentives and justifications are enticing enough. The obtainable result is creating a situation where the DPRK is unable to trade with the rest of the world, just as the sanctions initially intended, which forces the DPRK to return to negotiations. From past and present methods in the Iran model, the UN and its member states have been able to incentivize nations to halt trade and enforce sanctions on Iran.

**Data:**

Through focused research and case-study analysis, it was discovered that the aggressive approach and strategy utilized with Libya and Iran, including pressure and confrontation, were successful for both scenarios. In testing the three proposals that were principally successful with Libya or Iran, the effectiveness of diplomatic relations between Libya/Iran and the U.S. and UN, the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement against Libya and Iran, and specific incentives offered within these models, were found to encourage and achieve the desired outcome of halting nuclear pursuit.

***Libya***

The success of the Libya model involves the scenario in which Libya agreed to diplomatic relations and was incentivized by recognizing the parallels between economic prosperity and diplomatic relations:

Libyan officials secretly approached the governments of the U.S. and the UK about disclosing and ending Libya's WMD program. Thereafter, U.S. and UK



negotiating teams held secret sessions with Libyan officials, included visits to Libya in which that state revealed the extent of its nuclear activities. The U.S. and UK teams asserted that Libya must publicly disclose the extent of its programs and pledge to abide by those agreements regulating and monitoring WMD.<sup>32</sup>

After Libya agreed to denuclearization, the DPRK hinted that improved U.S.-DPRK relations could bring its representatives back to the negotiating table. Interestingly, and while the DPRK aggressively denied that it would ever cooperate with the international community's objectives to denuclearize, the nation released in this same statement a different, gentler sentiment writing, "If the Trump administration takes an approach to the DPRK-U.S. summit with sincerity for improved DPRK-U.S. relations, it will receive a deserved response from us."<sup>33</sup> In other words, if diplomatic talks are held that promote cooperation and appropriate processes, the DPRK will respond appropriately.

Parallel to the current efforts with the DPRK, Libya's nuclear pursuits caused various economic sanctions to be enacted by the UN and U.S. as a way to motivate the nation to halt its nuclear activity. Sanctions included arms embargoes, air travel restrictions, freezing of Libyan assets, and banning oil equipment exports to Libya, which were largely disregarded by Libya until improved diplomatic efforts were achieved.<sup>34</sup> As sanctions tightened against Libya and its trade partners and other UN member states were working to enforce these sanctions, Libya approached the United Kingdom and U.S. and began discussing the denuclearization agreements.

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<sup>32</sup> "U.S./UK Negotiations with Libya Regarding Nonproliferation" (The American Journal of International Law, vol. 98, no. 1, 195-97, January 2004), doi:10.2307/3139281.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> "Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States," Arms Control Association, 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology>.

## *Iran*

Successful denuclearization efforts were achieved mainly through diplomacy as the UN and other nations work to reach realistic agreements with Iran. Looking broadly at the various attempts and successes at reaching Iran's denuclearization, diplomatic relations have been the common denominator and accomplish denuclearization goals. Although Iran has often presented an adamant stance that it will continue building its nuclear program, diplomacy and adhering to diplomatic precedent has seemingly motivated Iran more than any other tactic. Rather than dismissing negotiations and continuing to develop a nuclear program, Iran appears to:

...leave the door open for diplomacy...Tehran has "never been hesitant to negotiate," and that "it is the U.S. that has to show that it is committed to the deal – that it will not violate it again, that it will not make demands outside the scope of the deal, that it will compensate Iran for the damages."<sup>35</sup>

The DPRK is seeking a similar commitment from the U.S. or UN in hopes that any agreed negotiations will truly benefit the DPRK and provide some comparable compensation for denuclearizing, rather than agreeing to denuclearize solely because of increasing pressure. Along with strategic diplomacy, also known as, "diplomacy that fulfills desired goals by using available means in the most effective way,"<sup>36</sup> UN member states and Iran's trade partners enforcing sanctions have led to successful negotiations and agreements with Iran over its nuclear pursuit. The success of the Iran model, "illustrated by effective sanctions" and most importantly, "high-level political communications,"<sup>37</sup> otherwise recognized as establishing a diplomatic relationship, are

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<sup>35</sup> "Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran," Arms Control Association, 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran>.

<sup>36</sup> Bong-Geun Jun, "Enough Failure: Use Strategic Diplomacy to Denuclearize North Korea," December 2016, <https://globalasia.org/data/file/articles/13d4afa6aadfbfb554870cca47ef1a3d.pdf>.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

necessary to resolve the DPRK issue. Iran agreed to denuclearizing elements of its nuclear program and accepted limitations on its ability to continue developing nuclear weapons. Rather than full denuclearization, Iran agreed to follow restrictions and sanctions on its nuclear program. From the Iran model it was learned that limiting and restricting Iran's nuclear program was a much more realistic and attainable goal than demanding full denuclearization. The DPRK could be amenable to limitations and restrictions rather than terminating its nuclear program all at once.

The goal of sanctions on Iran and the DPRK is to impact trade and limit economic potential, thus forcing the DPRK to abandon the illicit activity in return for the easing of sanctions. With strict sanctions that aim to severely limit Iran's market, nations are hesitant to engage in deals with Iran for fear of prompting sanctions against themselves for blatantly violating these sanctions and conducting this trade. However, evaluation reveals that shifting to maximum pressure methods and enforcing sanctions on nations that are not complying, is the most suitable method for sanctions enforcement.

The strategy used on Iran involves imposing heavy economic sanctions as a bargaining tool, on both Iran and member states.<sup>38</sup> The success of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal was possible due to member states' enforcement and support of such a deal, followed by Iran's agreement. The JCPOA, "places restrictions on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for easing global oil, trade, and financial sanctions."<sup>39</sup> In order to uphold this deal, member states and Iran's trade partners must fully comply with the set restrictions to

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<sup>38</sup> Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, "Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran," Federation Of American Scientists, 2012, <https://fas.org/issue-brief/sanctions-nonproliferation-north-korea-iran/>.

<sup>39</sup> "Two Years In-Iran Nuclear Deal Is a Verifiable Success," PAAIA, May 23, 2018, <https://paaia.org/CMS/31511.aspx>.

ensure that Iran is adhering to all sanctions and the JCPOA. The agreement was endorsed by P5+1 coalition (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, and Germany), the European Union, and Iran.”<sup>40</sup> In accordance with the JCPOA, Iran is required to adhere to a number of nuclear restriction mandates, including lowering uranium enrichment levels and other specific milestones to reduce Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, repercussions of enabling or supporting Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions evasions calls for sanctions to be placed on the enabling nation. In September 2020, the U.S. shifted its strategy towards noncomplying nations in the Iran model and warned:

The United States expects all UN Member States to fully comply with their obligations to implement these measures...If UN Member States fail to fulfill their obligations to implement these sanctions, the United States is prepared to use our domestic authorities to impose consequences for those failures and ensure that Iran does not reap the benefits of UN-prohibited activity.<sup>42</sup>

### ***(1) Incentivizing the DPRK to Negotiate***

Diplomacy and denuclearization was achieved by incentivizing Libya to negotiate. Libya recognized that improving and sustaining a healthy relationship with the UN and U.S. would bring greater economic and political prosperity for the nation – prosperity that could not be met if Libya continued its nuclear pursuit. While the similarity between the Libya model and the DPRK issue broadly concerns offering incentivizing reason to negotiate (improved diplomatic relations), the DPRK requires strong economic incentives for sanctions and eventual negotiations to be effective. As such, a parallel approach is to motivate the DPRK to reengage negotiations by providing

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> “Section 3: Understanding the JCPOA: Arms Control Association,” <https://www.armscontrol.org/2015-08/section-3-understanding-jcpoa>.

<sup>42</sup> “The Return of UN Sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran” U.S. Department of State, September 25, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/the-return-of-un-sanctions-on-the-islamic-republic-of-iran/>.

economic incentives. By agreeing to ease sanctions that severely impact the DPRK's economic system, the DPRK may be willing to denuclearize parts, or all, of its nuclear program, just as Iran did. Specifically, lifting sanctions resolution 2397, 2371, and 2375, which limit oil imports, coal, iron ore, lead, and bans exports of textile products, "can be alleviated commensurate to the denuclearization process."<sup>43</sup> The sanctions on imports and exports has caused significant financial strain on the DPRK and economic sanctions reliefs could be a possible, forcing hand. The DPRK could be incentivized to denuclearize if they are offered membership in the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank,<sup>44</sup> allowing its participation in legitimate trade and guiding its establishment as a functioning nation in the international market.

Iran is a member of both the World Bank<sup>45</sup> and the IMF,<sup>46</sup> but is not a member of the WTO.<sup>47</sup> The DPRK's membership in any world organization would require set obligations and transparency as Iran has attempted to join the WTO, "over twenty times in the last two decades, however, there were objections...about the nation's nuclear activity."<sup>48</sup> After the JCPOA and amendment of strict sanctions, Iran has become much closer to joining the trade organization, but will need to comply to additional trade organization and sanctions requirements before its admittance.<sup>49</sup> Joining the WTO has

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<sup>43</sup> Jungbae Seo, "Here Are Some Economic Incentives That Could Help Move North Korea's Kim toward Denuclearization," Atlantic Council, August 19, 2019, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trump-kim-north-korea-vietnam-economic-nuclear/>.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> "Member Countries," World Bank, 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members>.

<sup>46</sup> "List of Members," International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm>.

<sup>47</sup> Bennett O'Brien, "The 8 Most Important Trading Nations Who Aren't WTO Members," Trade Ready, 2020, <http://www.tradeready.ca/2016/topics/researchdevelopment/8-important-trading-nations-arent-wto-members/>.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

been used as a leveraging strategy to denuclearize Iran as joining the organization would increase the nation's ability to export its goods, all with significantly lower tariffs.<sup>50</sup> Iran applied for membership into the WTO in 1996, and since 2005, has held a "observer status," instead of official membership.<sup>51</sup> Due to Iran's continued nuclear pursuits, it has been barred from officially entering the WTO; the "accession process is actually member-driven" and consistently puts Iran at a disadvantage when seeking WTO admittance.<sup>52</sup> Since the WTO is described as, being the only international organization to set and regulate global trade,"<sup>53</sup> it has been leveraged to engage and motivate Iran's compliance with sanctions. Iran's acceptance into the WTO has been barred due to the nation's continued nuclear pursuit and member states that have rejected Iran's membership share that its membership will be considered only if it adheres to and complies with sanctions.<sup>54</sup> Economic sanctions and Iran's inability to trade freely with the international market caused the country's exports to decline, "33 percent on average, totaling USD 104 billion in lost revenues,"<sup>55</sup> from 2012-2014 alone. Although Iran has denuclearized without first gaining membership into the WTO, WTO membership represents collective economic improvements, or successes, Iran can reach if continued negotiations and active cooperation are achieved. Membership into the WTO and economic successes it would bring, is a reminder to Iran that it can improve its economy

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ece Aksop, "Option WTO to Assist Nuclear Nonproliferation-With Minuses and Pluses," E-International Relations, 2018, <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/10/24/option-wto-to-assist-nuclear-nonproliferation-with-minuses-and-pluses/>.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Saeed Ghasseminejad and Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, "The Impact of Financial Sanctions: The Case of Iran 2011-2016," Federal Reserve, May 2020, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1281.pdf>.

and improve trade, along with easing economic sanctions aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear pursuits.

With sanctions restricting Iran's energy trade, membership into the WTO would promote and sustain successful trade for Iran. Comparatively, the DPRK's global economic status and revenue generation is incredibly low and membership into the WTO and other global financial institutions will quickly improve the nation's economic standing. However, just as Iran's admittance into the WTO requires, the DPRK will need to agree to denuclearization, or at least partial denuclearization, and provide evidence that it has done so before any consideration of admission. Although the DPRK believes it can survive by trading with just a few trade partners, the successful economic incentives to halt trade with the DPRK will force the DPRK to consider a comparable agreement to the WTO's stipulations for Iran's membership. Although Iran agreed to denuclearization efforts without first gaining admittance into the WTO, it recognized that negotiating its partial denuclearization would open many other economic opportunities,<sup>56</sup> entrance into the WTO opening just one of many "doors" back into the world market. As the DPRK has indicated that easing sanctions could lead to accepting limits on its nuclear program, proposing enticing incentives would offer similar, if not greater motivation for the DPRK to accept to denuclearization negotiations. Lastly, incentivizing the DPRK to denuclearize in exchange for admittance into these world groups is a major motivating factor and will secure the DPRK's interest in rejoining negotiations, meaning that this last

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<sup>56</sup> Kali Robinson, "What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?," (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

proposal is feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective, based on comparisons drawn from the Iran model.

## ***(2) Establishing a Diplomatic Relationship with the DPRK***

The DPRK's history of systematic criminal activity and sanctions violations is a major concern and establishing an official, multilateral diplomatic relationship is a likely solution to these issues. The lack of multilateral relationships with key world powers has only prolonged these issues and caused UNSCRs to be principally ineffective and largely evaded by the DPRK. Diplomatic relations would not only increase each side's understanding of each other's motivations, but the summit talks hinted that the DPRK may seriously negotiate if it felt it had more allies in the international community. In other words, giving the DPRK an opportunity to create an alliance, under the right circumstances, could be an incentive worthy of denuclearization.

After the summit in Vietnam ended without diplomatic agreement, the DPRK continued to stress that it would implement, "denuclearization measures in exchange for sanction relief."<sup>57</sup> As sanctions relief is a key objective for the DPRK, the probability of lifting sanctions without establishing formal agreements and subsequent, working diplomatic relationships to reach such agreements, is currently nonexistent. However, as discussed in this study, incentivizing the DPRK to establish this relationship (and bringing the DPRK to the negotiating table) indicates this to be a feasible recommendation. Thus far, the DPRK has been unwilling to renegotiate and denuclearization will not occur without reinstating diplomatic talks, although the DPRK

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.



believes that the U.S. has been unwilling to compromise and reach reasonable agreements. Both the persistence of the DPRK and that it has not “liked” any of the proposed agreements suggests that the nation requires different motivations to both reengage in negotiations and to consequently agree to cooperate. If denuclearization talks continue, the UN and its member states, “could face the question of whether to aim for incremental dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program in step with gradual sanctions relief, or to try for a ‘big deal’ and demand that complete denuclearization precede full sanctions relief.”<sup>58</sup>

The UN imposed sanctions on Libya that enacted embargos on its various trade activities in condemnation of the country’s terrorist and chemical weapons program, just as it has done on the DPRK for these same reasons. While Libya’s final concession and agreement to dismantle its nuclear program was likely due to the country’s fear of war, “the years of sanctions and diplomatic efforts were more important.”<sup>59</sup> Well before the invasion of Iraq, the UN placed pressure on Libya in an effort to reprimand the country for its terrorist activities and nuclear pursuits and a serious break in diplomatic affairs occurred in 1981 when the U.S. expelled Libyan diplomats and closed the Embassy, signaling that the U.S. would no longer conduct diplomatic affairs with Libya. In 1995, “Libya makes a ‘strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities...’<sup>60</sup> and the UN and international community increased its pressure on the country and stressed the importance of diplomatic talks to reach an agreement. Throughout this, Libya was actively looking to reestablish diplomatic talks as a way to request that the UN and

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> “Fact Sheets” Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States (Arms Control Association, 2018), <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology>.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

international community lift sanctions and after years of restrictions and diplomatic pressure on Libya, the nation dismantled its nuclear program and allowed inspectors to verify its claims.<sup>61</sup> Libya recognized that reestablishing and holding diplomatic relations with the rest of the world would provide greater benefits than continuing to pursue a nuclear program. The country's willingness and desire to reestablish diplomatic relations allowed this model to be successful as both sides were able to compromise and the end-goal of Libya's denuclearization was achieved.

The willingness to denuclearize was driven and decided by Muammar al-Qaddafi who assessed that membership and acceptance within the international community was far more valuable and lasting than continuing to pursue a nuclear program. The success with Qaddafi and Libya's denuclearization was achieved through secret, diplomatic talks and the DPRK could benefit from a similar approach. While pressure from the international community increased on Libya, Qaddafi quietly conceded and met with the U.S. and United Kingdom in March 2003<sup>62</sup> to establish and proceed with the agreed upon framework:

Following those talks between [Libya] and the United States of America and the United Kingdom... [Libya] decided of its own free will to eliminate such materials, equipment and programmes, thus ridding itself of all internationally proscribed weapons.<sup>63</sup>

Rather than continuing in the public eye and creating increased tension with the international community, Libya agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. As the international community is closely watching the DPRK and likely influencing the

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Fact Sheets." Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States. Arms Control Association, 2018. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology>

<sup>63</sup> "U.S./UK Negotiations with Libya Regarding Nonproliferation" (The American Journal of International Law, vol. 98, no. 1, 195-97, January 2004), doi:10.2307/3139281.

DPRK's decisions to continue its nuclear program, similar secret talks and agreements made between the DPRK and U.S. (or other world powers) could provide a much-needed avenue for negotiation, away from the immense pressure and influence of the international community.

Therefore, the Libya model was successful and as predicted, is a feasible, desirable, and likely to effective model. In 2006, as agreed upon for dismantling its nuclear program, Libya established full diplomatic relations with the U.S. and other international partners. Throughout this process, an important message was received by Libya and sent to other nuclearized states – “In taking these actions, the United States dramatically demonstrates to the remaining rogue states...that our country takes note of positive changes in behavior and is more than willing to reciprocate.”<sup>64</sup> In an effort to directly share these sentiments with the DPRK, former U.S. Representative Tom Lantos traveled to the DPRK and explicitly argued that, “abandoning nuclear weapons – as Libya had done – would open the door to diplomatic relations with the United States and to significant improvements in bilateral political and economic relations.”<sup>65</sup> This “door” would need to be open as part of negotiations, as it was for Libya, and offer the DPRK a glimpse at what it could benefit from by establishing full diplomatic relations with the U.S. and its allies.

Holding secret negotiations could be a major “selling point” for the DPRK as Kim Jong Un may agree to new negotiations if discussions are private and away from “critics” who would claim he is being weak or foolish for denuclearizing. In other words,

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<sup>64</sup> Robert King, “A ‘Libyan Model’ for North Korean Denuclearization?,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 20, 2020), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/libyan-model-north-korean-denuclearization>.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

the DPRK could “save face,” as did al-Qadaffi, and both sides could reach the necessary agreements to reach a realistic compromise. With ego and pride driving Kim Jong Un’s nuclear desires, providing the DPRK with an opportunity to negotiate in private and away from “critics” could influence the DPRK to join the negotiation table and initiate and sustain denuclearization talks. As Libya was incentivized to improve its relationship with the U.S. and rest of the international community for the country’s livelihood and economic prosperity, the DPRK’s struggling economy and perpetual need for assistance provides a comparable model and accessible means to achieve a similar result.

### ***(3) Incentives for UN Member States and DPRK Trade Partners***

Under the terms of the JCPOA, “Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.”<sup>66</sup> The UN, U.S., and European Union agreed to lift its nuclear-related sanctions on Iran by easing, “restrictions on financial transactions, which have deterred international trade with Iran.”<sup>67</sup> Additionally, an existing UN weapons embargo was lifted and if any JCPOA participant suspects, “Iran is violating the deal, the UN Security Council may vote on whether to continue sanctions relief.”<sup>68</sup> Iran was able to evade sanctions with the help of its trade partners who benefited from Iran’s exports, such as oil and natural gas. Similarly to the DPRK, Iran would have been unable to evade UNSCRs without assistance from trade partners, meaning that the intended consequences of sanctions

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<sup>66</sup> Kali Robinson, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?,” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

relied on Iran's trade partners halting trade and enforcing these restrictions.<sup>69</sup> As the UN and JCPOA signatories were well aware of Iran's sanctions evasion practices, before the JCPOA was adopted, and before Iran could achieve sanctions relief, certification of Iran's halted nuclear activities was required.<sup>70</sup> As a result, "Iran agreed to eventually implement a protocol that would allow IAEA [The International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors unfettered access to its nuclear facilities and potentially to undeclared sites."<sup>71</sup>

The DPRK is unable to evade sanctions on its own and requires assistance from its limited, but resourceful, trade partners to survive the strain UNSCRs impose on its nuclear program and other revenue generating activities. Based on comparisons drawn from the Iran model, incentivizing and rewarding nations to enforce such sanctions reveals an efficient and impactful practice that has the great potential to negatively impact the DPRK's sanctions evasions tactics in these regions and eventually, around the world. Upon further analysis of the Iran model in comparison to the DPRK, it was discovered that relying on other nations to enforce the sanctions was a challenge as it was difficult to convince these non-complying nations of the impending and significant security concern Iran posed on the international community.<sup>72</sup> The Iran model found that the challenges of incentive-based agreements require, "...significant domestic political

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<sup>69</sup> Jackie Northam, "Iran And Trading Partners Will Find Ways To Skirt Sanctions, NPR, November 11, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/11/11/666297472/iran-and-trading-partners-will-find-ways-to-skirt-sanctions-analysts-say>.

<sup>70</sup> Renee Westra, "The Iran Nuclear Deal," Parliament of Australia, 2018, [https://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick\\_Guides/IranNuclear](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/IranNuclear).

<sup>71</sup> Kali Robinson, "What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?," (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020), <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

<sup>72</sup> "Bombs, Carrots and Sticks: The Use of Incentives and Sanctions," Arms Control Association, 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/sanctions/48189-bombs-carrots-and-sticks-the-use-of-incentives-and-sanctions.html>.

consensus that this goal is in the national interest, both in the country that would surrender such strategic weapons and in the countries that would aid them in doing so. Attaining this consensus usually requires serious internal bargaining...”<sup>73</sup> The UN was also concerned that nations would only uphold these sanctions to receive the incentives promised,<sup>74</sup> although having nations enforce sanctions against the DPRK, even if it is just to receive these promised benefits, would be a positive adjustment from the current situation.

In 2018, the DPRK imported \$2.32 billion and exported \$291 million worth of product.<sup>75</sup> Some additional nations not previously mentioned that conduct trade with the DPRK are: Zambia, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Switzerland.<sup>76</sup> To sustain its own economic system as well as believing that maintaining an economic relationship will positively influence the DPRK, these nations are engaging in trade with the DPRK, ignoring any position supporting or opposing the DPRK’s nuclear program. By providing economic incentives comparable or greater than what these nations are able to generate through trade with the DPRK, nations that are merely conducting trade with the DPRK for economic survival will no longer need to continue this exchange. The incentive relies on being able to replace, or match in some manner, the \$2.32 billion revenue generated so trade partners are not losing revenue. To replace this revenue, this method would establish new trade agreements with other non-sanctioned nations to halt trade with the DPRK.

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> “North Korea (PRK) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/prk/>.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

For example, in 2019, Zambia exported an estimated \$611.24 thousand worth of, “pearls, precious stones, metals, coins.”<sup>77</sup> India and Hong Kong are the world’s leading pearl importers,<sup>78</sup> but India in particular does not import pearls from Zambia.<sup>79</sup> By guiding Zambia towards pearl trade, or similar goods exchange, with India, Zambia’s reliance on the DPRK to generate export revenue on pearls will no longer exist.

Additional trade “swaps” will allow the DPRK’s trade partners to wean its reliance off of the DPRK. As such, promoting these nations’ trade products would sever the reliance on the DPRK and allow these nations to comfortably enforce trade sanctions against the DPRK, without suffering negative, economic consequences.

Moreover, incentivizing China to halt trade with the DPRK will cripple the DPRK’s entire trade and economic system as it relies on China for most of its import and export. China is another factor linking the similar effects of sanctions on Iran and the DPRK.<sup>80</sup> China is cited as fostering diplomatic relationships with both Iran and the DPRK, endorsing the DPRK’s illicit activities:

China has become a dominant trading partner of both Iran and North Korea, giving it significant leverage both in its relations with those two countries and with the United States...China has used its position on the U.N. Security Council to delay or weaken sanctions, while choosing to loosely or selectively enforce them. Still, the West needs to work with China to use its leverage to intensify diplomatic efforts with both Iran and North Korea.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> “Zambia Exports to North Korea,” 1995-2019 Data, 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/zambia/exports/north-korea>.

<sup>78</sup> “Pearls; Articles of Natural or Cultured Pearls Imports by Country,” 2018, <https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/ALL/year/2018/tradeflow/Imports/partner/WLD/product/711610>.

<sup>79</sup> “High Commission of India Lusaka, India-Zambia Relations,” 2019, [https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral\\_Brief\\_for\\_zambia\\_Jan\\_2019.pdf](https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief_for_zambia_Jan_2019.pdf).

<sup>80</sup> Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran,” Federation Of American Scientists, 2012, <https://fas.org/issue-brief/sanctions-nonproliferation-north-korea-iran/>.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 11.

Motivating China to halt all trade with the DPRK relies on providing specific economic incentives. Additional incentives, economic or otherwise, as expressed by China can also provide ample incentive for it to abandon its trade relationship with the DPRK. Severing the economic relationship with China, will force the DPRK to reconsider its economic and trade system, thus well positioning the international community to request that the DPRK rejoin denuclearization negotiations. Trade partners will halt all trade with the DPRK if a similar threat of looming sanctions is seriously anticipated. In an effort to sustain its own economic system and trade, DPRK trade partners would likely refrain and/or halt all trade activity.

Using Libya and Iran as comparative case studies offers concepts, theories, and actionable policy objectives and strategies for the UN and international community to consider. By using tactics that were successful with either Libya or Iran (or both) as examples, the international community must shift its current strategic efforts and incorporate one or more of these proposals against the DPRK. The DPRK issue is changing, daily, and predicting a feasible action plan relies on a system of trial and error. However, as this project deduces, drawing from, and modifying policies that were successful with Libya and Iran, predicts an actionable and implementable way forward against the DPRK for the UN and the international community, allowing for necessary modifications and adjustments along the way.



## Discussion

The importance of each proposal utilized against the DPRK was found from experiences drawn from the Libya and Iran models. Although the perfect DPRK analogy does not currently exist, the findings of this study reveal that relevant elements of the Libya and/or Iran models can be combined to create a feasible approach. The existing difference between the DPRK and Libya and Iran concerns the idea that the latter nations were fundamentally open to negotiating and assessed that complying with sanctions and falling to international pressure, would be beneficial for its well-being and future objectives. Libya was motivated to comply to international pressure through improved diplomatic relationships with the West and Iran is motivated continuously by diplomacy *and* increased economic incentives. Furthermore, a key distinction between the DPRK issue versus the Libya and Iran issue is that the U.S. and its allies have been in and out of the Middle East for the last 30 years. The established military footprint and active cooperation from regional host governments to counter a wide variety of threats was possible when the international community was defending against Libya, and current efforts to defend against Iran. Defending against the DPRK requires an altered approach as the U.S. and its allies have a rather small presence on the Korean peninsula, in comparison to the presence in the Middle East. Approximately 28,500 U.S. personnel are supporting the United States Forces Korea operation in the ROK,<sup>82</sup> vastly smaller than current estimations that there are over 80,000 U.S. personnel presently defending in the

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<sup>82</sup> Clint Work, "How to Constructively and Safely Reduce and Realign US Forces on the Korean Peninsula: Informed Analysis of North Korea," 38 North, August 25, 2020, <https://www.38north.org/2020/08/cwork082520/>.

Middle East<sup>83</sup> and the approximate 199,400 U.S. forces<sup>84</sup> in the Middle East at the time of Libya's agreement in 2003. While the presence in Northeast Asia is much more integrated and deliberate than the widely dispersed troops in the Middle East, the lack of "boots on the ground" and show of force (according to troop numbers) in the DPRK and the inability to impose a show of military force over the nuclearized nation has severely restricted the international community's ability to diplomatically, or otherwise, reach agreements with the DPRK.

Further, the international community's approach towards Iran differs from its past and current efforts against the DPRK. In 2002, when it was first reported that Iran was operating an "elusive uranium enrichment plant," key nations engaged in a debate, "as to whether to refer the issue to the UN Security Council or give diplomacy a chance to resolve the problem."<sup>85</sup> All nine UNSCRs against the DPRK target the DPRK leadership and, "underestimated how well the regime could adapt and sustain itself under dire circumstances."<sup>86</sup> Iran previously claimed that the development of nuclear weapons was to maintain peace<sup>87</sup> and would make the international community safer and the DPRK is currently making these same claims. Iran was hit heavily with economic sanctions by the

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<sup>83</sup> "How Many U.S. Troops Are in the Middle East?," U.S. News, 2020, <https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020-01-09/after-recent-deployments-how-many-us-troops-are-in-the-middle-east>.

<sup>84</sup> Linwood Carter, "Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces," Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2005, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31763.pdf>.

<sup>85</sup> Bo Ram Kwon, "The Conditions for Sanctions Success: A Comparison of the Iranian and North Korean Cases," (Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, March 2016), <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298715566>, 143.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 150.

<sup>87</sup> Henry Sokolski, "After Iran: Back to the Basics on 'Peaceful' Nuclear Energy," Nuclear Energy (Arms Control Association), <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-04/iran-nuclear-briefs/after-iran-back-basics-peaceful-nuclear-energy>

U.S., as well as nine UNSCRs that imposed economic embargo, ban on all Iranian imports, ban on Iranian aircraft trade, and an arms ban.<sup>88</sup>

Realistically, the DPRK may be an issue that exists well into the future, without any effective strategies or methods to combat the nation's growing nuclear desire. Rather than look for ways to fully denuclearize the DPRK, approaching the situation with specific objectives and milestones, drawn from the Libya and/or Iran model may be a more feasible way forward. Although diplomatic talks and incentives may or may not resolve the issues of continued DPRK nuclear testing, talks and incentives will eventually lead to the DPRK's assurances of closing nuclear plants, destroying a number of ICBMs, and leading the DPRK towards reconsidering its plans for eventual, full denuclearization – likely depending on the amount of effort and assistance other nations are willing to provide. There are numerous motives for the DPRK's adamant stance on growing its nuclear program, the DPRK's primary reason for holding onto its nuclear program has been cited as safety and security reasons. Although, experts assess the real reason the DPRK is unwilling to disarm is Kim Jong Un's nuclear pride. Admitting that the current nuclear program and economic system cannot concurrently function would, "show weakness and invite challenges to his own power. He certainly can't acknowledge the failure of his own policy — the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the national economy."<sup>89</sup> All three proposals tested in this study offers the DPRK an "escape" from its current, broken policies. Diplomatic talks will ease Kim Jong Un's pride and the tremendous economic gain will replace the pride the country feels for its nuclear program. Additionally, the DPRK will recognize that threatening the use of

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

nuclear weapons on its enemies, nations that have been categorized as enemies for condemning the DPRK's nuclear pursuit, detract from the DPRK's ability to work strategically with these same nations through established and improved diplomatic relations. If the DPRK continues believe that it requires protection and security, methods to do so without engaging in nuclear war will be offered by these new, diplomatic partners.

### **Conclusion:**

As expressed throughout this report, the DPRK is a fascinating and unique criminal state. The entirety of the nation operates as a criminal enterprise, with illicit revenue generating activities sustaining its economic system and funding its prohibited nuclear program. If the DPRK was able to join the various world groups, such as the WTO, the nuclear nation would not need to conduct criminal activity to sustain its economy. This then begs the causality dilemma of, "which came first: the chicken or the egg?" In this instance, the dilemma is, which comes first: lifting sanctions to economically motivate the DPRK to fully denuclearize so it may join the world market, or the DPRK must fully denuclearize before sanctions can be lifted and the economic incentive of allowing the nation to join the world market is authorized?

Further, the implications of nuclear conflict with the DPRK are of serious concern for the international community. With UNSCRs in place to restrict and motivate the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear arms program, the questions concerning how this might be possible and what necessary steps are required by the UN to enforce such sanctions must be addressed before implementing new sanctions or reformed attempts at enforcing

current sanctions. By testing and analyzing the Libya and Iran models against the DPRK, the findings discovered a key pattern: the DPRK is an entirely elusive threat and the nuclearized nation possesses the unmatched ability to provoke fear of nuclear war and retaliation. As the DPRK is a varying security threat and has consistently changing factors that shift the scope of analysis, the successful methods drawn from the Libya and Iran model provided feasible, desirable, and likely to be effective strategies to implement against the DPRK.

As the comparative tests revealed, diplomatic relationships must be formed with the DPRK before any expectation of negotiation or resolution can be desired by the UN and international community. Furthermore, conclusions drawn from the Libya and Iran model reiterated that the DPRK must be dealt with in an innovative manner, but the solutions are not entirely unique. To Kim Jong Un, the only substantial equity the DPRK has to lose is its nuclear program, but contrastingly, the DPRK has much to gain, economically, if enticed to denuclearize. Lastly, should the international community assess that incentives for compliance are not feasible, and UN sanctions are the only viable way forward, strict implementation, enforcement, and cooperation from all UN member states is critical for its success. With an increasing threat on the safety and security of the international community, prioritizing deterrence efforts against the DPRK to reduce and/or eliminate the threat of nuclear war is a difficult endeavor that requires swift and concentrated efforts.

## Appendix

### *UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) –*

On 14 October, a short five days after the DPRK's first nuclear test, the UN Security Council, "unanimously adopted Resolution 1718 imposing economic sanctions on North Korea"<sup>90</sup> in an effort to reprimand and remind the DPRK that nuclear testing and activity will not be tolerated by the UN and the broader international community. Concurrently, the UN created the "UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea" also known as, "Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718," citing the Security Council's need for a committee dedicated to monitoring and condemning, through appropriate sanctions resolutions, the DPRK's threatening behavior. The Security Council documented:

Expressing the gravest concern at the claim by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006, and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond.<sup>91</sup>

Further, Resolution 1718's principal provisions demand that the DPRK, "refrain from further nuclear or missile tests...shall suspend all ballistic missile activities... shall abandon its nuclear program in a 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible' manner... [and] shall abandon all WMD activities."<sup>92</sup> Resolution 1718's principal sanctions included requiring member states to freeze the funds or financial assets of entities providing

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<sup>90</sup> "Resolution 1718 (2006)," United Nations Security Council (United Nations Security Council, 2006), [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1718%20\(2006\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1718%20(2006)).

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> "Resolution 1718," UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2006, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

support for the DPRK's nuclear, missile, and WMD program,<sup>93</sup> as well as prohibiting member states from, "the 'direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer'" to the DPRK including, heavy weaponry and spare parts for heavy weaponry (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, warships and missile systems), materials and technologies that could assist the DPRK's WMD and missile program, and luxury goods.<sup>94</sup> A large element of Resolution 1718's monitoring mechanisms included the creation of the Security Council's Committee on North Korea which composed, "of the 15 current members of the Security Council to function as a monitoring body to review and adjust the imposed sanctions and violations of the sanctions."<sup>95</sup>

Although Resolution 1718 did not accomplish its intended goal of compelling the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear program and activities for good, it was far more successful than the previous UNSCRs. After the passage of Resolution 1718, the Six Party Talks, "a series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and attended by China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the purpose of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program"<sup>96</sup> occurred and seemingly outlined and partially accomplished key objectives in denuclearizing the DPRK. The DPRK initially claimed that it would abandon, "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs' and return to the NPT" and the DPRK disabled a plutonium producing nuclear reactor.<sup>97</sup> However, as disagreements concerning methods to verify the DPRK's commitment to the agreement increased, further progress was heavily delayed and ultimately, Resolution

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> "The Six-Party Talks at a Glance," Arms Control Association, June 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks>.

<sup>97</sup> "Resolution 1718," UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2006, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

1718 and its monitoring mechanisms failed as the DPRK continued to build its nuclear program, with assistance from long-time, on-again-off-again trade partner, China. The intended outcome of Resolution 1718 was to halt the DPRK's nuclear activities and prohibit trade to the DPRK to reduce its ability to procure the necessary materials to sustain its nuclear program. Although Resolution 1718 prompted positive negotiations with the DPRK, the outcome of Resolution 1718's failure occurred on 25 May 2009 after the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test, despite the UNSCRs in place, Six Party Talks, and other international precedents strictly calling for the DPRK to further cease all nuclear weapons procurement and testing.

*UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) –*

On 12 June 2009, Resolution 1874 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council and called for the DPRK to join the CTBT and expanded on Resolution 1718's arms embargo by banning, "all imports and exports of weapons, excluding small arms."<sup>98</sup> Enforceable by Resolution 1874, member states were authorized to, "inspect North Korea cargo on land, air, and sea, if the state has reason to believe that it contains prohibited items and seize any prohibited materials or technologies."<sup>99</sup> Member states were asked to, "prohibit public financial support for trade with North Korea that would contribute to nuclear, ballistic missile, or WMD-related activities."<sup>100</sup> Resolution 1874's monitoring mechanisms included establishing a seven member expert panel, the DPRK "Panel of

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<sup>98</sup> "Resolution 1874," UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2009, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.



Experts” to assist the Committee and report on possible violations of sanctions.<sup>101</sup>

Further, the Panel of Experts was required to provide recommendations for improving sanctions implementations and determine how the DPRK was continuing to evade the strict sanctions. The Panel of Experts attempted to impose a sanction that provided an objective to the international community, which was to come together to force the DPRK to end its nuclear program. The intention was, that if the DPRK did not have materials and trade partners to acquire new materials, that it would be forced to denuclearize.

By now, the DPRK had set an obvious pattern as it continued to evade and violate sanctions without any actionable consequence, aside from prompting additional UNSCRs. Unfortunately, Resolution 1874 proved unsuccessful when the DPRK successfully launched a satellite on 12 December 2012 – a violation of both Resolution 1718 and 1874, prohibiting, “any further development of technology applicable to North Korea’s ballistic missile programs.”<sup>102</sup>

#### *UN Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013) –*

On 22 January 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 which called for member states and the broader international community to “remain vigilant” and continue monitoring individuals and entities associated with the DPRK in any manner.<sup>103</sup> Resolution 2087’s principal sanctions were expansions of Resolution 1718 and 1874 and emphasize states’ rights to, “seize and destroy material suspected of heading to or from North Korea” and directing the DPRK sanctions committee to take action to, “designate

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> “Resolution 2087,” UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2013, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

individuals or entities that have assisted in sanctions evasion.”<sup>104</sup> Differing from previous sanctions, Resolution 2087 did not implement any new monitoring mechanisms, likely due to the UN’s growing realization that the DPRK was not, and is not, adhering to any imposed sanctions. Resolution 2087 failed as two months after its adoption, the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013.<sup>105</sup> The DPRK’s obvious and methodical disregard for UN sanctions was now abundantly clear, however, the Security Council and Panel of Experts collectively agreed and decided that imposing yet another sanction might finally cause the DPRK to reconsider and disband its nuclear program.

*UN Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013) –*

On 7 March 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 that differed from previous sanctions by explicitly mentioning, “uranium enrichment in its condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities.”<sup>106</sup> This Resolution also noted that the DPRK was seemingly abusing the many immunities granted to its diplomats and welcomed recommendations on targeting and implementing financial sanctions to urge member states to apply and fulfill the sanctions.<sup>107</sup> Just as the sanctions before it, Resolution 2094 sought to make it more difficult for the DPRK to evade sanctions and further its nuclear program, as well as “directing states to enhance vigilance over North Korea’s diplomatic personnel.”<sup>108</sup> One particular evasion method used, and still used by the DPRK, is having official DPRK diplomats sent overseas to conduct illicit revenue

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> “Resolution 2094,” UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2013, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

generating activities for the regime. By establishing official Embassies and missions in nations that welcomed them, the DPRK conducts complex money and revenue generation activities and nuclear procurement activities that are largely barred by UNSCRs.

However, as DPRK diplomats have the immunity afforded to all diplomats, these sanctions evasion techniques were not immediately recognized. Resolution 2094 sought to expose this practice and its monitoring mechanisms included expanding the Panel of Experts to include eight people, one more than the founding seven Panel of Experts members. Three years passed before the Security Council determined that a new Resolution was needed to curb the DPRK's continued illicit activities. Yet again, all previous UNSCR's failed to dismantle the DPRK's nuclear program as it conducted its fourth nuclear test and launched its second satellite on 6 January 2016.

*UN Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) –*

On 2 March 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 which prohibits states from providing specialized training and materials to the DPRK and decides that the DPRK must abandon all chemical and biological weapons and programs in accordance to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>109</sup>

Additionally, Resolution 2270 calls to expand the arms embargo to include small and light weapons, prohibit the DPRK from servicing and repairing weaponry sold to third parties, and prohibits the trade of luxury goods.<sup>110</sup> Financial implications include, asset freezing on all discovered DPRK government and DPRK entities' financial transactions

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<sup>109</sup> "Resolution 2270," UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

in association with prohibited activities. Moreover, this Resolution vastly expanded the financial sanctions placed on DPRK banking entities overseas and prohibited UN member states from hosting and processing financing that may be associated with proliferation efforts, prohibited states from opening new financial institutes in the DPRK, and required states to terminate any existing joint-DPRK ventures.<sup>111</sup> New monitoring mechanisms were not included in Resolution 2270 and it and all past sanctions up until 2016 proved ineffective and unsuccessful as the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test on 9 September 2016.

*UN Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016) –*

On 30 November 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2321, which at its inception, was the most expansive sanctions resolution on the DPRK, to date. Resolution 2321 called for significant reduction of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts worldwide and for the first time, emphasized the need for the DPRK to, “respect the inherent dignity of its people in its territory.”<sup>112</sup> Resolution 2321 also called for the prohibition of exporting minerals, such as copper, nickel, silver, zinc, iron and iron ore, and selling or transferring coal in large amounts.<sup>113</sup> Resolution 2321’s monitoring mechanisms introduced a, “standard notification form for coal purchases from North Korea to track imports against the cap set by the resolution” and also directed the Panel of Experts to conduct meetings specifically designed to address regional concerns

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> “Resolution 2321,” UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

and, “build capacity to implement the measures in 2321 and other North Korea sanctions.”<sup>114</sup>

*UN Security Council Resolution 2371 (2017) –*

On 5 August 2017, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2371 in response to the DPRK’s two ICBM tests that occurred in July 2017. The principal restrictions of Resolution 2371 bans the export of raw materials, such as seafood, coal, iron and iron ore, and lead and lead ore. Additionally, new sanctions language was added that prohibits the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank – the DPRK government’s primary exchange bank – denies international port access to vessels violating resolutions, and bans states from allowing in additional DPRK laborers.<sup>115</sup> Essentially, Resolution 2371 is an expansion of Resolution 2321 as the Security Council and Panel of Experts again recognized that the DPRK was continuing to evade sanctions, without any impact to their nuclear program. Resolution 2371’s monitoring mechanisms asks for Interpol to publish DPRK individuals’ travel bans to provide the Panel of Experts, “additional analytic resources to better monitor sanctions enforcements.”<sup>116</sup>

*UN Security Council Resolution 2375 (2017) –*

Following the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test on 3 September 2017, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2375 on 11 September 2017, targeting DPRK oil imports,

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> “Resolution 2371,” UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

textile exports, and overseas laborers.<sup>117</sup> According to the Security Council, this Resolution is the strongest sanction against the DPRK and condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic weapons over the welfare of its people.<sup>118</sup> Resolution 2375's principal sanctions state a full ban on textile exports, caps refined petroleum imports at 2 million barrels per year, freezes crude oil imports, bans all natural gas imports, prohibits member states from approving DPRK nationals to work in their jurisdictions otherwise approved by the Panel of Experts, imposes asset freezes on discovered DPRK entities revenue generation, and bans all joint ventures or cooperative initiatives<sup>119</sup> with the DPRK. Its monitoring mechanisms include providing additional guidance for states to interdict DPRK cargo and ship transfers. Despite restricting nearly every import, export, and revenue generating activity overseas, the DPRK evaded such sanctions and increased its illicit ship-to-ship transfers, relying even more on their diplomats posted overseas to conduct revenue generating activities to support the regime. To the Security Council and international community's displeasure, the eight sanctions placed on the DPRK up until September 2017 were not effective in denuclearizing the nation. After Resolution 2375 that called for the most severe restrictions on the DPRK, to date, the DPRK conducted its most recent missile test on 29 November 2017.

*UN Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017) –*

Resolution 2397 is the most recent UN sanction against the DPRK and was adopted on 22 December 2017, in direct response to the DPRK's missile test. Resolution

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<sup>117</sup> "Resolution 2375," UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

2397 emphasizes much of Resolution 2375, but in a much stronger effort, calls for the expulsion of all DPRK laborers, worldwide.<sup>120</sup> Countries were given until 22 December 2019 to expel DPRK laborers in their nations as it was acknowledged that DPRK laborers overseas contribute greatly to its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Additionally, it called for an increased ban on petroleum, crude oil, exports of food, agricultural products, minerals, and electrical equipment, in an effort to force the DPRK to fully cease its nuclear program. As over a year has passed since the 22 December 2019 deadline to expel DPRK laborers overseas, the specific impacts of Resolution 2397 are largely unknown. It is known that many nations have complied with this Resolution, but information is still being gathered on which nations have not fully enforced and expelled all DPRK laborers. A caveat to Resolution 2397 that will likely be exploited by the DPRK is the ability for most DPRK diplomats to remain in that nation and perform their “diplomatic” duties. This could mean that the DPRK will place an even greater strain on its diplomats to generate revenue for the regime, thus negating the intention of Resolution 2397 to limit revenue and subsequently denuclearize the DPRK.

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<sup>120</sup> “Resolution 2397,” UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association, 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

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